We develop and experimentally test a model of bidder behavior in a simultaneous ascending auction for heterogeneous common value goods. The model follows the 'straightforward' strategy developed by Milgrom (2000) while accounting for the adverse selection effect and the potential for the winner's curse. When this model is evaluated against laboratory results we find that bidders deviate from the predicted price path as we observe extensive jump bidding and lower final prices than predicted. We observe that jump bidding generally increases prices and decreases earnings, suggesting that jump bids are based on bidder impatience rather than strategic motivations. Despite the failure of the model to predict bidder behavior, it does offer significant predictive power regarding the final allocation of goods and avoidance of the winner's curse.
Introduction
Simultaneous ascending auctions (SAA) have become an increasingly common method for auctioning government assets to the private sector. They have played an enormous role internationally in selling rights to electromagnetic spectrum, having been used by nine countries and acting as the primary method of distribution in the US (Bulow et al 2009) .
Generally speaking, these auctions are used to sell multiple goods simultaneously (heterogeneous or homogeneous) via an increasing price format. Bidders raise the price for goods as the auction progresses and the auction is complete when no bidder desires to continue bidding.
Under the context of private value spectrum rights this type of auction has been studied extensively. Theoretical research has yet to identify a Nash equilibrium dynamic bidding strategy for a SAA. Research by Milgrom (2000) developed a non-strategic equilibrium model of bidder behavior that is analogous to the single unit ascending auction strategy. In the single unit English auction, the dominant strategy is for bidders to raise the price in small increments until all bidders drop out at their private valuation but one, who then wins the auction at the reservation price of the last drop out bidder. Expanding this to multiple heterogeneous goods which are mutual substitutes, he shows that a "straightforward" bidding strategy of maximizing round-to-round surplus will yield prices and allocations that are close to the predicted competitive equilibrium. 1 Experimental research has played an extensive role in guiding auction design regarding SAAs.
Banks et al (2003) make a compelling case for augmenting theoretical predictions for a SAA with laboratory and field tests 2 and proceed to exhaustively test different auction design 1 An alternative formulation for selling multiple goods simultaneously is to have the auctioneer declare a schedule of prices for all goods and then solicit a schedule of demand at those prices from each active participant. Gul and Stachetti (2001) and Ausubel (2006) have shown that a Walrasian equilibrium in prices and allocation is possible in this environment as well. 2 One of their principle arguments rests on the extent to which the assets being sold actually conform to the properties ascribed to them. They contend that electromagnetic spectrum and oil and gas leases likely have private and common value components. They note that there could be a continuity of private to common value, such that a bidder's (uncertain) value could be ‫ݒ‬ = ߙܲ ෨ + (1 − ߙ)ܿ, where ܲ ෨ is the uncertain individual private value and ܿ̃ is the uncertain common value. For a strict common value auction (the focus of this paper), ߙ = 0; for a private features under consideration by the Federal Communications Commission for their spectrum auctions. Isaac et al. (2005) test Milgrom's straightforward bidding theory in a private value SAA and compare it to their own theory which allows for more strategic bidding considerations. Plott and Salmon (2004) also test the straightforward bidding strategy against experimental data and extend the comparison to UK spectrum sale data. In both papers, the authors find that the straightforward bidding theory generally does not match up well to actual bidding behavior.
However, they both also note that the theory performs well in predicting auction outcomes such as allocation and prices.
The US Department of Interior has expressed interest in using an SAA to sell offshore oil and gas leases, which is the primary motivation for this research. Offshore oil and gas lease auctions have a long history of being treated as a common value asset in the auction theory literature, starting with Capen, Clapp, and Campbell (1971) . Our goal is to assess the behavior of subjects participating in a possible common value SAA. We do this by extending the straightforward bidding model of Milgrom (2000) to the common value paradigm. We employ the theoretical structure of Kagel and Levin's (1986) common value with affiliated signals and adapt it to straightforward bidding. Our discussion above has shown that experimental analysis can be used to both test theory and provide a guide for decision making when theory is incomplete or overly reductive. Consequently we test our model against an experimental evaluation of a common value SAA, designed to reflect many relevant features of the offshore oil and gas industry.
As in Isaac et al (2005) and Plott and Salmon (2004) , we find that the straightforward bidding model does not accurately portray bidder behavior in this environment. Bidders engage in jump bidding, a phenomenon that is not predicted in our model. These large jumps in price occur predominantly in the first auction round, but are non-trivial afterwards. Increases in jump bidding are associated with decreases in individual earnings and increases in average price paid, suggesting that bidders jump bid out of impatience rather than having a strategic motivation for jump bidding. Despite the general failure of the model to predict behavior, we find that it value auction, ߙ = 1. Their argument that ߙlies between zero and one makes experimental evaluation an appealing option as there is no theory upon which to evaluate auction performance if ߙ lies in that range.
has some predictive power regarding auction outcomes, especially regarding the final allocation of auctioned goods (oil and gas leases). Revenue and lease price predictions generally fall short of predictions, a situation which we largely attribute to difficulty in maintaining bidding eligibility. Bidders overwhelmingly avoid the winner's curse, suggesting that they are internalizing the adverse selection effect when placing bids.
Theory and Methods

SAA Rules/Structure
Simultaneous ascending auctions (SAA) are a general class of auction with a wide variety of potential rules. At their most basic level they are an extension of the standard English auction to multiple goods auctioned simultaneously. Bids can be placed individually on any good by any bidder; all goods are available for bidding until the auction closes when no bidder would like to raise the price on any good.
Plott and Salmon (2004) and Cramton et al. (2006) provide a comprehensive overview of the classes of rules that can apply in a SAA. Differences in these auction rules can significantly alter the decision-making context bidders face in a SAA. Importantly, an auctioneer must decide how bids are submitted through time; bids can be solicited on a continuous rolling basis, or over a sequence of discrete bidding periods. If the auction proceeds as a sequence of discrete bidding periods, bidders may be restricted in the number of bids they can place per period. Bids can be subject to both increment and activity requirements, as well as a minimum initial bid.
Increment requirements dictate how much a new bid must improve the provisionally winning bid and can vary over goods and/or time. Activity requirements force bidders to maintain a level of bidding activity to remain eligible to submit bids. Typically bids and identities are known with full transparency; only private valuation information is unknown across bidders. An auction stopping rule typically ends the auction when a bidding period passes during which no new bids are submitted.
It is important to note that the specific properties of the good being auctioned may have a significant effect on the functioning of a SAA. 3 Goods are commonly modeled as having an independent private value to each bidder, which is known with certainty prior to bidding. In the most common setting where SAAs are employed, public asset divestment to the private sector, it is often the case that the auctioned assets have a common value component. This means that the realized value of the item will be the same for all bidders regardless of who wins. This common value is typically assumed to be subject to uncertainty at the time of bidding due to technical limitations in assessing value. For instance, a license for electromagnetic spectrum may have common value as a productive input to the wireless communications industry, but that value could vary given future uncertainty in demographic or technological trends. Differing forecasts of these trends will result in different a priori assessments of value for each bidder.
This uncertain asset value strongly influences bidder behavior in these auctions versus a private value SAA employing the same rules.
Bidder Behavior
The primary behavioral strategy that has been used to describe bidder actions in a SAA auction is "straightforward" bidding. Milgrom (2000) and Plott and Salmon (2004) expanded the standard equilibrium bidding strategy in a single unit ascending auction to the multi-unit case for private values. This basic behavioral heuristic is appealing as a basis for describing outcomes in SAAs for two reasons. First, it is a relatively easy strategy for bidders to employ and will ensure bidders will not experience losses in a private values setting or in expectation in a common value setting. Second, it is general enough in its assumptions that it can be applied across a wide range of private and public information value-structures, without the narrow applicability associated with specific value distributions.
Straightforward bidding can be characterized by the dual strategy of surplus maximization and bid minimization. When deciding where and how much to bid at the beginning of an auction round, it is useful to describe bidder i's choice set as a personalized vector of current item prices. Thus a bidder sees a list of prices comprised of their own standing high bids, the minimum bids needed to overtake the high bids of others, and the reserve prices for items which have not received a bid. A bidder maximizes their surplus by looking at their current price vector and bidding on good ܽ ‫)ݐ(‬ which follows:
Bidder ݅ bids on good ‫)ݐ(ܽ‬ which gives the largest difference between the expected value of good ݈, ‫ܧ‬ ‫))݈(ݒ(‬ and the current price of that good, ‫‬ ௧ (݈). Given that each good starts at an initial positively valued reserve price and that there exists a minimum bid increment ݉, the minimum bid will be:
for goods which have a standing high bid, and ‫‬ ௧ ൫ܽ (‫)ݐ‬൯ = ‫݁ݒݎ݁ݏ݁ݎ‬ for goods which have yet to receive a bid. The bid on the maximally valued good in period ‫ݐ‬ will simply be the minimum required by the bid increment rule. This process repeats itself successively across auction rounds until no bids are submitted in a round, upon which bidding for all items is ended and the auction is complete.
Unlike the private values setting of Plott and Salmon (2004) , in a common value SAA the value of each good is unknown to each bidder at the time of bidding. Rather each bidder receives a vector of private information signals ‫ݏ‬ (݈) that are informative of the true common value of each good. Thus, surplus maximization compares the expected value of each object, given private value signals, to the current price. For a given object, a bidder must a priori infer from their private signal the expected value of that good, ‫ݏ|ݒ(ܧ‬ ).
Private information signals are assumed to be drawn independently from a symmetric distribution around the true value of the good, and are thus an unbiased estimator of the true value. However, when bidders are symmetric and employing the same strategy, the winning bidder must realize that the highest of the ܰ − 1 other bidders' signals is less than her signal.
Conditioned on having the highest signal, her estimate of value should then be less than the unconditional expectation, i.e. ‫ݏ|ݒ(ܧ‬ = ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ) < ‫ݏ|ݒ(ܧ‬ ). Bidders only earn profits when they win, and have no a priori knowledge about how their signal compares to others, therefore all bidders must adopt this conditional expectation of value. Not accounting for this when formulating a bidding strategy can lead to negative profits from overestimating the actual value, which is known as the winner's curse.
Theorems 1-3 from Milgrom (2000) are applicable in the case of a common value SAA with straightforward bidding and show that a competitive equilibrium that maximizes total value to participants in a finite number of rounds is possible under straightforward bidding. To address the uncertain nature of value across goods in a common value setting, we need to say something about how bidders form expectations about value.
Assumption: Assume all goods are mutual substitutes with uncertain common value and bidders bid straightforwardly in a SAA. Bidders condition their expectation of value on their signal being the highest of ݊ signals, and from the initial bidding period assume that they are competing against the maximum number, ݊ = ܰ, of potential bidders on every good. Thus bidders' expectation of value in equation (1) is:
Intuitively, let bidders ݅ = 1 … ܰ face an individualized expected value vector Since all bidders are actively recalculating the potential surplus possibilities at all sites in every round, the high signal holder will have the highest value expectation of each good when all bidders employ a symmetric strategy under a competitive equilibrium. If winning bidders do not condition their value expectation on the fact that the value signal will generally be larger than the true value, or if they expect less than ܰ bidders to be active on each good, they will be overestimating the true value of winning.
Experimental Setting
An experimental simulation was employed to compare the behavioral model against the behavior of actual bidders in this environment. Due to the complex decision making environment, subjects for the experiment were recruited from graduate students at the University of Rhode Island in business, economics, and finance. Subjects were also recruited from a pool of the top earners from prior unrelated experiments.
To further prepare subjects, a training session was mandatory for all participants prior to participating in the data collection portion of the experiment. This session included a detailed "classroom" example of a common value auction for M&M's, feedback on the results of that auction, a thorough discussion of the winner's curse and auction rules, and finally a series of auctions like those they would face in the actual experiment. Subjects were required to demonstrate that they understood key auction features via positive earnings in the training auctions before they were allowed to participate in data collection.
4
Of a total of 50 participants in the training sessions, 37 participants successfully met the training criteria and 34 participated in data collection. There were a total of 10 data collection sessions with 6 participants in each. Subjects were allowed to participate more than once but to limit the potential for collusion at no point were there more than two subjects in a session that had been together in a prior session.
multiple goods auctioned simultaneously via an ascending price format. As this research was motivated by the possibility of using an SAA to auction oil and gas leases, the design parameters were chosen to closely reflect that potential environment. Each session featured 6 bidders, each of whom had a utilization constraint of three items; a bidder could bid on and win more than that, but could only take value from three. Two experimental treatments were conducted which varied the supply of goods to be auctioned. One treatment was a relatively competitive auction with 20 units for sale; the other treatment featured 42 units for sale and, given experimental parameters, had more than twice the amount of potentially profitable items than were demanded. where ߝ = 200. Signals were rounded to the nearest whole integer. Subjects bid without knowing the true value of any good, but they knew their private signal and the distribution from which it (and all others) was drawn. In pursuing a straightforward bidding strategy a bidder must calculate the value expectation of each auction item given their private signal information. To avoid the winner's curse they must also remember to condition their expectation on having the highest signal of ܰ signals for each item. Given the above information, we can calculate the conditional expected value of a good as (see appendix 1):
Bids for all goods were to exceed a reserve price of 100, and bids were subject to activity rules and minimum bid increments. Bidders could place a maximum of 3 bids per round, but were not required to do so. If they bid less than 3 times in a round they reduced their bid eligibility for the next round to the number of bids placed in the current round. Bids were required to be 10% or more above current standing bids for rounds 1-5; after that the increment was based on the amount of bidding activity on a particular good. Bids must be 1% higher if there were no bids on an object in the previous round, 2% higher if there was one bid, and 5% higher if there was more than two bids. See table 1 for an overview of experiment parameters.
Equilibrium Predictions
To compare our experimental results to the hypothesized bidding model, it is necessary to derive equilibrium predictions on auction prices, good allocation, and auction duration. Similar to the private values SAA model of Plott and Salmon (2004) , equilibrium occurs at a vector of prices in which no bidder can increase their expected surplus with continued bidding. 6 The tatonnement-like process of bidding sees bids initially placed on the goods with the highest expected surplus, and since signals are positively affiliated 7 in this design, bids are generally concentrated on the same goods. As the expected surplus of these goods is eroded over subsequent rounds, bidders move to bidding on different goods and the expected surplus across all goods in the terminal allocation decreases in unison throughout the auction.
The competitive equilibrium of this model requires that demand be unconstrained. This means that a bidder has neither a budget, utilization, nor other constraint which prevents them from bidding on all units. In this case bidders will continue to drive bidding to a Walrasian competitive equilibrium, where all bidders expect non-positive surplus on all goods for which they are not the provisional winner. 8 This equilibrium also predicts that all units are won by the highest signal holder and that the winning bidder pays the expected value of the second highest signal holder.
Our experimental environment deviated from this by introducing a utilization constraint for each bidder, restricting demand to 3 units per bidder. Our first treatment, which we call the "competitive" treatment, thus featured 18 units demanded by 6 bidders. Experiment parameters imply that the average number of units with expected value greater than the reserve should be 18. While the overall supply constraint was just binding in this case, the random variation in signal draws left some bidders with excess demand above their constraint at the conclusion of bidding. Having acquired the 3 units they saw as most valuable, these bidders still expected positive surplus on units they did not acquire. Since they were no longer eligible to bid on these due to the utilization constraint, other bidders were able to acquire these at a price lower than predicted at the competitive equilibrium.
In the treatment with 42 goods for auction, called the "open" auction treatment henceforth, the auction dynamics remained the same, however the final vector of prices and surplus changed. Bids were again placed on the highest signaled goods first, with expected surplus 7 Affiliation is a strong form of correlation across bidders' signals for the same good. Roughly speaking it means that if your private valuation signal for a good is large, then the other bidders' signals are more likely to be large as well. See Krishna (2009) for more discussion of this concept in the context of auctions. 8 In this supply constrained environment, the expected surplus of winning a unit is equal to the difference between the expected value of the highest and second highest bidders. I.e. the high bidder wins the item at the drop out price of the second highest signal holder (with an error not larger than the bid increment).
coming down as rounds progressed and prices increased. This progressed until all bidders exhausted their demand, at which point every bidder was content with their allocation despite positive expected surplus from goods which attracted no bids. This generally left a final allocation where the expected surplus from the last acquired good just equaled that of the highest non-acquired good. As in the competitive treatment, bidders can receive more than their expected share of high signals (for a 42 unit auction each bidder should have the high signal on 7 units). This has the same effect of introducing some per auction variation into the final allocation on the marginally acceptable units.
As both treatments fall short (by design) of the unconstrained demand condition and its equilibrium predictions, we computationally calculated estimates of equilibrium conditions using straightforward bidding. To computationally solve for the equilibrium auction path and outcome, an R program (see appendix #) was employed. The program uses the straightforward bidding rules of equations (1) and (2) and actual experimental value and signal draws to determine the equilibrium auction path and outcome for each auction. The program makes some assumptions regarding activity rules 9 , bidding increments 10 , and limits on provisional holdings. These assumptions are revisited when relevant in the next section.
Results
Auction Outcomes
9
Regarding our activity rule, non-strategic bidding behavior would rule out holding more than three goods at any point in time. For the purposes of computationally determining equilibrium properties, we will assume at no point do bidders hold more than 3 leases, and all bidders place one bid per round until one or more bidders no longer find it profitable in expectation to continue bidding (the competitive equilibrium). Our experimental results suggest that bidders will initially increase their exposure (provisional wins + new bids) beyond the utilization constraint in order to maintain bid eligibility. This is one of a set of strategies for maintaining bid eligibility until the competitive equilibrium. While it does not mirror the computational strategy, to the extent that they both achieve the same goal while following the straightforward bidding strategy, the equilibrium auction allocation should be the same. This equivalence would not hold for auction duration, as the model tends to overestimate the duration in this regard.
10
Regarding minimum bid increments, Milgrom (2000) states that, in the presence of a time-variant bid increment, equilibrium projections should be made using the last applicable bid increment. With a decreasing increment across rounds, this simplification tends to overestimate the number of auction rounds to completion. Because of this we do not attempt to predict the number of rounds per auction. We find that bidders did well to avoid the winner's curse. Only twice out of 366 total lease wins did a bidder realize a loss from overbidding. In total there were 12 cases out of 1224 bids where a bidder bid in excess of their conditional expected value given ݊ = ܰ in equation (4). This is a strong result which suggests that bidders are internalizing the adverse selection effect into their bidding behavior. Since this is not a drop out auction where bidders can conditionally update their beliefs about the true value, we see this as a validation for this part of our model. Table 3 gives an overview of the model's allocation predictions and the experimental results. To give a comparative benchmark, we compare our results to a bidding strategy where wins are allocated in the absence of a predictive model. 11 As there is no behavioral model to date for this auction environment, this allows us to compare our model to that (admittedly low) baseline.
The final allocation predictions can be seen in two ways: does the model predict which leases will be won, or does the model predict who will win each lease? The first is a lower standard to 11 The "random" model randomly allocates winners to tracts up to the utilization constraint then compares the allocation to the experimental results. The given numbers are the mean of 10 iterations of this process. meet and our model does well in predicting which leases were won, with a 91% success rate in the competitive auction and an 82% success rate in the open auction. However, these numbers are not overwhelmingly better than those predicted by the random allocation model. We do note a significant difference in allocation predictions between models when we look at who wins which lease. While our model does not predict the majority of these cases (25%/46% for open/competitive), it performs four times as well as the random allocation baseline.
While the model has predictive power regarding the final allocation of leases, we find that it consistently overestimates final lease prices. Figure 1 shows a histogram of the errors in price prediction for both treatments. For the 317 leases which were correctly predicted to receive a bid, we find that the mean bid is 53% lower than predicted in the competitive treatment and 32% lower in the open treatment. These are both significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. There are many possible explanations for this (and we go through some in the next section), but it is worthwhile to note here that the activity rule in the experiment made it challenging for bidders to remain eligible to bid as the auction progressed. The computational predictions of the straightforward bidding model assumed that all bidders remain eligible until demand is exhausted for leases 12 , and thus they should be considered an upper bound on lease prices.
Auction Path
The straightforward bidding model predicts that bidders will sort through the available leases and bid the minimum acceptable level on those that offer the most surplus at the time of bidding. We tested the experimental data for this bidding pattern using the following relationship (cross section is lease and time step is the ordinal sequence of bids on that lease): 12 We specified an alternative model which strictly accounts for activity requirements. In this scenario, a bidder would never have provisional wins and outstanding bids greater than the utilization constraint. This did not fit the data well, as bidders often found themselves, at least initially, with provisional wins and new bids in excess of the utilization constraint. This model also quickly erodes bidders' eligibility, leading to average predicted final holdings around half of what we observed. It appears from the data that bidders work around the bid eligibility initially by increasing their exposure to losses (having holdings greater than the utilization constraint). This moves the auction along towards the equilibrium conditions specified by competitive straightforward bidding by maintaining eligibility.
In this regression, the constant estimates the percentage change between subsequent bids across all leases, and ߚ is a parameter which captures how this rate changes as more bids are submitted on a lease. We ran this estimation for each treatment and also separated the estimation by the bid increment rule that was in effect. 13 Prior to round six, all leases were subject to a minimum 10% increase; after round six the bid increment varied between 1-5% based on how many bids a lease had seen in the previous round. The results, laid out in table 4, indicate that all treatments and rounds saw bid increases that were larger than predicted. Bids did not generally change as a function of time, though we note that bids did see a slight but significant decrease in the latter rounds of the competitive auctions. Even more noteworthy is that bidders in the competitive treatment generally increased the provisional winning bid by 13% even after the minimum bid increment was lowered in round 6.
The above estimation does not tell the complete story of how bidding progressed through the auctions. If we take a round-by-round look at lease price progression, we see a more complicated story. Table 5 shows the mean and median improvement in lease prices, the total number of bids, and the number of bids that could be classified as jump bids. The mean and median improvements refer to the increase over the provisionally winning bid or the reserve price. Jump bids are classified as bids that meet some threshold above the minimum acceptable bid. There is no standard for classification, here we took the approach that a jump bid is a 25% increase beyond the minimum improvement; i.e. for a 10% minimum increase, we denote a bid 13 We also omitted 5 observations (out of 896) that were significant outliers to the dataset (bids that were more than double the current standing bid).
as a jump bid if it is beyond 12.5%. A big jump was classified similarly as double the minimum needed.
14 It is clear from the data that jump bids make up a majority of bids in the first round and that these jumps are large versus the required bid. Jump bids are also present in later rounds, but
are not nearly as prevalent as in the first round, generally falling under 25% of all bids in the first five rounds. We also note that the extreme outliers of some of the jump bids heavily influence the mean bid improvement, and likely color our regression results in table 4. The median observations show a pattern that is generally consistent with straightforward bidding in all rounds but the first and the sixth. However, jump bids are not predicted by the straightforward bidding model and they appear to be a systematic part of our bidding data.
Thus we must dismiss straightforward bidding as a comprehensive model of bidding behavior in this common value simultaneous ascending auction.
Jump bidding has been noted elsewhere in studies of SAA's. In reviewing the literature on jump bidding in ascending auctions, Isaac et al. (2007) categorize three separate explanations for jump bidding above and beyond non-rational bidding. The first is the "flat-maximum" argument, which suggests that there are multiple different bid amounts that give basically the same expected payout and thus bidders do not worry about making small "mistakes" in bidding beyond the minimum bid increment. The second reason they give for jump bidding is bidder impatience, meaning bidders wish the auction to close sooner than later. The last reason given is strategic bidding. Strategic bidding can take the form of strategic signaling as in Avery (1998) , where bidders signal a very high willingness to pay in the first round on an item to discourage further bidding. Isaac et al (2007) suggest a more subtle motivation where bidders attempt to 14 These thresholds are significantly larger than those used by Isaac et al. (2007) in their analysis of US and UK spectrum auction data. We justify this by the parameterization of our experiment, where bids were rationally restricted to the interval [101,1000]. As bids were restrained to take integer (discrete) values, exact minimum improvements were often not possible. Isaac et al. (2007) also mentions the possibility that bidders may take a "flat-maximum" approach to bidding, where if several possible bids yield about the same expected value as a bid at the minimum bid increment, bidders may not worry about making "mistakes" or correcting for rounding errors. We find this to be a very plausible argument in our environment and thus expand the threshold for jump bidding. When the bid increment falls to between 1-5% after round 5, the above argument essentially guarantees that all bids will be classified as jump bids.
get into bid path "notches" to force an outcome where the final price paid is lower than it should be due to the minimum bid increment.
We do not find extensive support for signaling behavior in the data. While the majority of jump bids occur in the first round, we continue to see significant jump bidding in every auction round contrary to the predictions of Avery (1998) . Issac et al (2005) note that for bidders to want to engage in signaling behavior they would have to experience a lowering of final prices and an increase in surplus. Figure 2 shows the relationship between jump bidding and bidders' per lease profit across both auction treatments. In both treatments there was a negative relationship between profits and an increase in jump bidding. While we do note overall lower prices than predicted by the straightforward bidding strategy, we find that an increase in jump bidding increased the cost of leases (see figure 3) . Thus, while we cannot rule out signaling or other strategic behavior, we find that bidders employing jump bidding earn less on average than those who do not.
Of the listed motivations for jump bidding, we find bidder impatience to be the most compelling fit to our data. In the absence of a financial motivation for jump bidding, continued bidding beyond the minimum bid increment could be motivated by a desire to quickly end the auction. In addition to jump bidding, we also observe a trend where bidders continue to adhere to the larger minimum bid increment rule of rounds 1-5 even after the bid increment is reduced in round 6. These reasons suggest bidder impatience is the most likely candidate for the prevalence of jump bidding.
Conclusion
This paper has two main goals. The first is to extend the existing straightforward bidding model of a simultaneous ascending auction to the common value environment with affiliated signals.
The second is to analyze experimental data of a common value SAA for empirical regularities and to compare the data to the hypothesized bidding model. We found that bidders largely did not follow the straightforward bidding model, yet it had a non-trivial ability to predict auction outcomes, especially regarding which leases were acquired and who won.
The major behavioral deviation from straightforward bidding we observed was jump bidding.
This phenomenon was first discovered by McCabe et al. (1998) , and has been extensively studied in the context of SAAs. Our findings are most similar to those of Isaac et al. (2005) , who note persistent jump bidding throughout the auction. We do not note a systematic difference in jump bidding when increasing the number of available leases in the open treatment. While the open treatment auctions generally ended earlier, bidders still experienced a reduction in average earnings from jump bidding. They also continued to bid well above the minimum required after the bid minimum was decreased after round five. This is suggestive of bidder impatience and perhaps also reflects a difficulty in projecting how long a given auction might last, especially given the heterogeneous adoption of the jump bidding strategy.
That the model's predictions show success in predicting auction outcomes in this complicated environment indicates that jump bidding may not play a large role in eventual auction outcomes. Though we note heterogeneity and pervasive jump bidding initially, the latter rounds are characterized by an increase in straightforward bidding and a rising "efficiency" of holdings. It is also interesting to note the robustness of the allocation predictions in the face of a strong activity rule. Bidding eligibility rules by their nature pose a challenge to reaching a competitive equilibrium; the rule we used in our environment seems to have played a role in preventing prices from reaching their competitive predictions. However, since the rule impairs everyone equally, it is not surprising that it left the relative holdings intact and primarily affected the final lease prices.
Since the experimental environment was benchmarked to be representative of a potential SAA for offshore oil and gas leases, we were constrained to a fairly non-competitive environment.
We are able to see some differential effects from expanding the lease sale, but even our most competitive environment generally left no one with excess demand. The straightforward bidding model predicts that even these auctions would feature competitive bidding on the highest valued leases (which satisfy aggregate demand) until prices came down to the first unacceptable lease. While we do generally see this, this study would benefit from a third treatment with demand greater than supply to see if our results are robust to that more competitive environment, especially as regards jump bidding.
The straightforward bidding model does not fully appear to capture bidding behavior in a common value SAA. Our trained bidders were able to internalize the adverse selection problem, as predicted, but did not fully adhere to the strategy of minimum bids on the leases with the most surplus. As the deviations from straightforward bidding appear to be motivated by bidder impatience, a logical next step would try to incorporate time preferences into a bidding model as has been attempted in the private values SAA literature. the fact that, if they win, they must have received the highest signal of value in a symmetric equilibrium. The expected value of winning for a bidder assuming she has the highest signal can be denoted ‫ݏ|ݒ(ܧ‬ = ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ). The high signal holder should expect the true value of the auctioned item to be lower than their signal, as ‫(ܧ‬max ‫ݏ‬ ‫)ݒ|‬ > max ‫ݏ(ܧ‬ ‫)ݒ|‬ = ‫.ݒ‬ This adverse-selection effect becomes more pronounced when facing more bidders. For ݊ > 1:
Bids placed below ‫ݏ|ݒ(ܧ‬ ) but above ‫ݏ|ݒ(ܧ‬ = ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ) can be attributed to a lack of understanding of the adverse-selection effect, and would yield negative expected profits on average. 
To get an expectation, multiply by value and integrate over the range for value
Piecewise integration and simplification yields
in accordance with equation (1).
For signals in regions 1 and 3, the process is similar. For these regions, the analog to equation (2) is
Which, by the same process as above, results in
Appendix 2: Training Instructions Welcome
This training session's goal is to prepare you to participate in an economic experiment related to auctions in the coming days. Participating in this session and understanding the concepts we discuss today should put you in a good position to earn a considerable amount of money in the upcoming experiment. Whether or not you will be invited back for the experiment depends on how well you perform in a trial auction today, so it is important that you pay close attention. This session should be under two hours and will contain training relevant to the upcoming experiment, as well as some exercises to get you familiar with auctions.
Instructions for M&M Auction
1. The first activity today will be an informal auction for containers of unknown quantities of M&M's. A single container will be auctioned off in each auction round, and there will be 3 auction rounds. No earnings will be tracked during this auction, but the M&M's you earn are yours to keep.
2. In each auction, your task is to submit a written bid for the container, based on your impression of the contents of the container. Everyone will be given the opportunity to submit one bid per auction. Your bid offer will be from the M&M's you are allocated at the beginning of the session. You are not to reveal your bids to other bidders.
3. Along with the bid offer you make, please also note your guess of the actual contents of the container. This will not influence the results of the auction and can be different from your actual bid. These guesses will be looked at later and hopefully any generalities we can make will reinforce our training here today.
4. After all bids have been submitted they will be displayed and we will note the high bid and reveal the contents of the container. The highest bidder gets the container of M&M's, and pays the amount of their bid. Everyone else retains their current holdings of M&M's.
5. After the final round, we will summarize the results and discuss their implications in the context of this game and more generally as they apply to the upcoming experiment.
Winner's Curse
• The auction that you just participated in is a "common value" auction, in the sense that there is the same amount of M&M's in the container regardless of who wins. Thus the value of the container is the same, or common, to everyone.
• Bidders in this type of auction are susceptible to a "winner's curse," where the winner of the auction finds that the value of the item is less than their bid.
• Since each person bids based on their best guess of how many M&M's are in the container, people who have higher guesses are likely to bid higher.
• Since the winner of the auction is the one who has the highest bid, the winner is likely one of the most optimistic in their best guess at the number of M&M's.
If you win:
Profits = (Value of Item) -(Your Bid)
• If guesses are right on average, then it is likely that the highest guess is an overestimate of the number of M&M's in the container. Thus the high bidder may be cursed by winning the auction and paying more for the item than it is worth.
• This winner's curse is more prevalent when there are more bidders.
• It is not in your best interest to win the auction if winning means you lose money. Your take-away earnings are based on your income at the end of the experiment, not on how many auctions you won.
• To avoid the winner's curse you will want to reduce your bid to reflect the fact that if you win the auction, it is likely because your guess is more optimistic than average and most likely an overestimate.
Review
• People who participate in common value auctions can end up "cursed" by winning the auction and paying more than the value of the auctioned good.
• In the auction environment you will face, your "best guess" of the true value of the good will be based on the expected value information you can derive from your signal and what you know about the max/min values of the good.
• This "best guess" that you are given represents the average true value you would expect to see on based on your signal.
• Since you only know your private signal, you cannot know with certainty if your "best guess" exceeds the true value. Based on the way the signals are generated, roughly half the time your signal and best guess could overestimate the true value.
• Your bid dictates two things:
o Your chance of winning the auction o How much you earn if you are the winner
• In the event that you do win the auction, it is likely that you were the person with the highest "best guess" of value. If you did not reduce your bid significantly below your best guess, it is also very likely that you paid more than the value of the item.
• Since any given signal can be over the true value without a person knowing, significantly reducing your bid below your best guess is the only way to consistently avoid overpaying while still retaining the opportunity to make a profit.
Auction Environment
M&M vs. Experiment Auction (EA)
• Value o M&M -Randomly drawn from 0-100.
o EA -Randomly drawn from a preset interval.
• Value Signal o M&M -Physical inspection of container.
o EA -You are given a private signal which has a known relationship to the true value, V.
Signals
• The private signal you receive is drawn from a given symmetric interval around V.
• Based on your signal, you can calculate a range for V.
• If private signals were common knowledge, you could get a better estimate of V.
Expected Value (EV)
• EV is the average V you would see if you received a specific signal a large # of times.
• EV & Signals:
o If you have a signal that generates an "interior range" of V, then the signal is the EV.
o If your signal generates an interval that is partly out of the range for V, you can adjust the range and the new center point is the EV.
o The EV can be interpreted as your "best guess" of the true value based on your signal.
o This EV, or "best guess," will be given to you.
Appendix 3: Experiment Instructions
The rules below adapt those found in to simultaneous ascending auction, see the other paper for the base set of experiment instructions: http://cels.uri.edu/enre/StudentDocs/RG%20JMP%2011-14-11.pdf
The Auction Rules
For the next set of objects, we will alter the rules of the auction. The primary change is that you will have a chance to see others' bids, and to increase your bids in response.
Other than the rules of the auction, nothing will change. The true value of each object is still a random number between 0 and 1000, with all values equally likely, and your signals are still selected from an interval of plus or minus 200 around the true value. You may still receive value from up to three objects, but you must pay for all objects you win.
In today's auction, there will be several rounds in which you may submit bids. This allows you to increase your bids on objects you did not win, or to submit bids for additional objects.
The rules of the auction are as follows:
Bids
You may submit bids on up to three objects in each round. Bids will be solicited one at a time by the experimenter.
Minimum bids
To speed the auction, the amount by which bids must increase is determined by the round number and the number of bidders on the object. For the first five rounds of the auction, new bids must be 10% higher than the current winning bid on a object. After the fifth round, bids must be 1% higher if there were no bids on a object in the previous round, 2% higher if there was one bid, and 5% higher if there was more than two bids.
The initial minimum bid levels are set by the experimenter, and are not related to true object value. The minimum bid may exceed the object value.
Activity Rules
You may never submit more bids in a round than you did in the previous round. Thus, if in one round, you submit only two bids, two bids is the most you may submit in any subsequent round. Once you submit no bids in a round, you are done bidding, but your winning bids stand unless someone outbids you.
Invalid bids will not count toward your activity.
If you do not wish to submit a bid when one is solicited, enter "9999" to reduce your allowed activity. In subsequent rounds, do not submit a bid.
Updated Information
After each round, the screen at the front of the room will update to display current status of the objects in the auction. This includes the current high bid on each object, the tentative winner (the ID that submitted the tentative high bid), and the minimum next bid required to become the tentative winner.
Winning Bids
The auction will end after the first round in which only one bid is submitted. Each object will be awarded to the highest bidder. The highest bidder will pay the amount of their bid. Ties will go to the first bidder to submit the bid.
Strategy
Note that in this auction, you have opportunity to observe what others bid on objects, and thus to draw inferences about what signals of value they have. This can suggest whether their values are higher or lower than yours, and whether you might be bidding more than the true value of the object.
Questions
How well you understand these rules and procedures are an important determinant of how much you earn in today's experiment. Think back now over the experiment, and if you have any questions, please raise your hand now. Once the experiment begins, no talking among subjects will be permitted.
